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Abstract 
Based on earlier, pioneering work done at IIASA, this paper presents a model of 
endogenous technological change under the three potential most important “stylized 
facts”: increasing returns to adoption, uncertainty, and heterogeneous agents following 
diverse technology development and adoption strategies. As an intermediary step 
towards the final, long-term research objective of developing a multi-agent model, this 
paper deals with two heterogeneous agents, a risk-taking one and a risk-aversion one. 
Interactions between the two agents include trade on resource and good, and 
technological spillover (“free-riding” and technology trade). With the two 
heterogeneous agents, we run optimization to minimize their aggregated costs to find 
out what rational behaviors are under different assumptions if the two agents are 
somehow cooperative. The global optimal solutions of the two-agent model are of 
Pareto optimality in the sense that none of the two could be made better off without the 
other being made worse off.  The simulations show how agent heterogeneity — 
different risk attitudes and sizes, trade between agents and technological spillover effect 
influence the technological change process. Finally this paper plots and analyzes 
emission paths as results of different technological change process. 
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An Agent-Based Model of Endogenous Technological Change: 
An Extension to the Grubler-Gritsevskyi Model 
Tieju Ma 
1 Introduction 
It has been widely recognized that the development and diffusion of new technologies is 
the most important source of long-run productivity and economic growth (see e.g. 
Metcalfe 1987; Freeman 1994). But new technologies do not fall like “manna from 
heaven”. Technological change is costly. New technologies commonly need high 
investment on R&D and demonstration projects at their early stages, and with the 
increase of accumulated experience in new technologies, costs of using them tend to 
decrease. This is what we called technological learning. Historical evidences of 
technological learning in energy systems include reductions of investment for 
photovoltaic cells, gas turbines and windmills with the increase of their cumulative 
installed capacities (see Grubler et al. 1996; Nakicenovic and Rogner 1996; 
Nakicenovic et al. 1998; Watanabe 1995 and 1997). With decreased costs, new 
technologies can see further more adoptions of them, thus technological learning is a 
classical example of increasing returns (see Arthur 1983 and 1989). Technological 
change or technological learning is highly uncertain, which is evidenced by investment 
cost distributions for biomass, nuclear, and solar electricity generation from numerous 
engineering studies (see IIASA-WEC 1995). The importance of technological 
uncertainty has been recognized and explored ever since the earliest days of global 
environmental modeling (e.g., see Nordhaus 1973; Starr and Rudman 1973).  
In most of traditional models, technological change has to date largely been treated as 
exogenous, i.e. technological change, typically in form of improvements in engineering 
and economic characteristics of individual or aggregate technologies, is a free good and 
also known with perfect foresight within a given scenario of technological 
“expectations”. This is both the case for models developed within the tradition of 
growth theory and associated production function models (so-called “top-down” 
models), as well as those developed within a systems engineering perspective (e.g., 
detailed sectorial “bottom-up” optimization models). In both modeling traditions, 
technological change is either reduced to an aggregate exogenous trend parameter (the 
“residual” of the growth accounts), or introduced in form of numerous (exogenous) 
assumptions on costs and performance of future technologies. Common to both 
modeling traditions is that the only endogenous mechanism of technological change is 
that of progressive resource depletion and resulting cost increases, which also explains 
that the inevitable outcome of imposing additional (e.g. environmental) constraints on 
the model: rising costs due to the forced adoption of more costly capital vintages that 
remain unaffected by endogenous policy variables in the model. Such constraints which 
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are at odds with historical experience (see Barnett and Morse, 1967) trigger both 
substitutions of factor inputs as well as the penetration of otherwise uneconomic 
technologies. These are either represented generically as aggregates in form of so-called 
“backstops” (see Nordhaus 1973), or through detailed assumptions on numerous 
technologies individually. 
Traditional deterministic, social planner models have been criticized (e.g. Grubler and 
Messner 1998) for being overly naive and "optimistic" on the feasibility of meeting  
constraints, as availability and adoption of new technologies will be much slower and 
discontinuous due to agent heterogeneity and uncertainty than suggested in traditional 
policy models. However, traditional models can also be technologically too 
“pessimistic”, as missing out on important spillover effects and adaptive, innovative 
behavior that arises precisely because of agent heterogeneity and interaction.  
Modeling the endogenous uncertain technological change has got increasing concerns in 
recent years (see Grubler, Nakicenovic and Nordhaus 2002). This paper firstly 
introduces Grubler and Gritsevskyi’s deliberately highly stylized model of endogenous 
technological change through uncertain returns on learning (see Grubler and 
Gritsevskyi, in press), then extends the model by considering explicit agent 
heterogeneity. Following the tradition of agent-based modeling (see Ma and Nakamori 
2005) – studying macro-level complexities from the interactions in micro-level, which 
is combined here with the modeling field of optimization under uncertainty, agent 
heterogeneity is represented by their different risk attitudes and weights. The interaction 
between agents is represented via trade on resource and goods, as well as through 
technological spillover. With two heterogeneous agents, we run optimization to 
minimize their aggregated costs to find out what rational behaviors are under different 
assumptions if the two agents are somehow cooperative. The global optimal solutions of 
the two-agent model are of Pareto optimality in the sense that none of the two could be 
made better off without the other being made worse off.    
Technological change has the potential impact on human society, and hence some social 
issues maybe act as drivers or resistance of technological change. This paper addresses 
environmental issues as possible drivers of technological change.  
Mathematically, the resulting problems are non-convex stochastic optimization 
problems. Matlab’s Optimization Toolbox (version 3.0) was used to solve the 
optimization problems, which applies a sequential quadratic programming (SQP) 
method. In this method, the function solves a quadratic programming (QP) subproblem 
at each iteration. An estimate of the Hessian of the Lagrangian is updated at each 
iteration using the BFGS formula. A line search is performed using a merit function. 
More details of the method can be found in the user’s guide of Mathworks (See 
Mathworks 2004). Global optimality of solutions was checked by employing different 
starting points. 
The model presented here is not intended to be by any means a “realistic” model in the 
sense of technological or sectorial detail. Rather, the main objective of the model is for 
exploratory modeling purposes and as a heuristic research device to examine in depth 
the impacts of alternative model formulations on the endogenous technology transition 
dynamics.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a stylized model of 
endogenous technological change through uncertain return on R&D investment with 
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one decision agent and  gives analysis on simulation results; section 3 extends the 
model by considering two heterogeneous agents and analyzes various simulation results 
with trade and technology spillover between the two agents; section 4 plots and 
analyzes emission paths which are the results of different technological change process; 
and section 5 gives concluding remarks.    
2 Stylized Model of Endogenous Technological Change with One 
Decision Agent 
This section introduces a stylized model of endogenous technology change through 
uncertain learning with one decision agent. 
2.1 The Grubler-Gritsevskyi model 
Our optimization model of technology choice is based on Grubler and Gritsevskyi’s 
earlier work (see A. Grubler and A. Gritsevskyi, in press), and it is conceptually simple. 
We suppose one primary resource, whose extraction costs increase over time as a 
function of resource depletion. The economic system demands one homogeneous good 
and the exogenous demand increases over time.  There are three kinds of technology, 
namely “Existing”, “Incremental”, and “Revolutionary”, which can be used to produce 
the good.  The “Existing” and “Incremental” technologies need consuming primary 
resource for producing the good, while the “Revolutionary” hardly need no resource 
input.  • The “Existing” technology is assumed to be entirely mature, its cost and 
efficiency do not change over time, and the emission of using it is a little bit 
high.  • The “Incremental” technology has a slight efficiency advantage. With a higher 
initial cost than that of the “Existing” technology (by a factor 2 higher than the 
“Existing” technology), it has potential for technological learning (we assume a 
mean learning rate of 10%), and its emission is lower than that of the “Existing 
one”.  • The “Revolutionary” technology’s initial cost is much higher than that of the 
“Incremental” one (by a factor 40 higher than the “Existing” technology), but its 
learning potential is also higher (we assume a mean rate of 30%). It has little 
emission. 
Technological learning is uncertain. We represent an uncertain learning rate through an 
uncertainty range around the mean value adopted based on a lognormal distribution 
which accords with empirical data (see Messner and Strubegger 1991). The uncertainty 
was introduced into the model as an additional cost in the objective function. The 
stochastic model responds to a frequent criticism of traditional optimization models: the 
inappropriate assumption of a decision-making agent that operates under perfect 
foresight. Through endogenization of uncertainty, decision making in the model no 
longer operates under perfect foresight.  
We address environmental issues as possible drivers of technological change. The 
existence, timing, and extent of possible future environmental constraints, e.g. in form 
of carbon taxes, are highly uncertain. Carbon taxes are introduced in the following way. 
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We assume that the establishment of the tax is uncertain with a given occurrence 
probability of 0.33. The introduction time (in case the tax would be established) is also 
unknown with an expected cumulative distribution function that goes from 0 in the first 
decision time to 99% in the final decision time.  
With the homogeneous good, three different technologies, and uncertain carbon tax, we 
run optimization to minimize the total discounted cost of the economic system, thus the 
results denote optimized paths of technology development and diffusion.   
Here we give the mathematic expression of the model. The demand is exogenous and it 
increases over time as shown in Eq. (1).   
 100(1 )t tD α= +  (1) 
where t  denotes time period (year), tD  denotes the demand in t , and α  is the annual 
increasing rate of demand.  
Let tix  ( 1,2,3i = ) denotes the annual production of technology i  at time t , and let iη  
denotes technology i ’s efficiency, then the annual extraction tR  is the sum of resources 
consumed by each technology, as shown in Eq. (2) 
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1
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t t
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i i
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Thus the cumulative extraction by time t  is: 
 
1
,
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t j
j
R R
=
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The extraction cost of the resource increases over time as a linear function of resource 
depletion, as shown in Eq. (4)  
 
0t t
E E Ec c k R= +  (4) 
where tEc  denotes the extraction cost per resource unit at time t , 
0
Ec  is the initial 
extraction cost, tR is the total extraction by decision time t , and Ek  is a constant 
coefficient.   
Let tiy  ( 1,2,3i = ) denotes the annual new installation of technology i at time t , then 
the total installed capacity of technology i  at time t , denoted by tiC ( 1,2,3i = ) can be 
calculated according to Eq. (5).  
 ,
i
t
t j
i i
j t
C y
τ= −
= ∑  (5) 
where iτ denotes the plant life of technology i .  
The cumulative installed capacity tiC  of technology i by time t  is calculated as: 
 
0
1
.
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=−∞ =
= = +∑ ∑  (6) 
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Technology learning is based on experience which is quantified by the cumulative 
installed capacity, thus future investment cost is a function of cumulative installed 
capacity, as shown in Eq. (7) 
 
0 ( ) ,ibt tF i F i ic c C −= ×  (7) 
where 2 ib−  is the progress ratio (1 2 ib−−  is the learning rate) of technology i, and 0Fic  is 
the initial cost of technology i. 
The following intertemporal optimization will be used to minimize the total cost.  
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where  
T denotes the scale of the problem,  
δ  denotes the discount rate,  
OMic denotes the operating and maintenance (O+M) cost of technology i ,  
ρ  denotes decision maker’s risk attitude (a smallρ  denotes a risk-taking 
attitude, and a big ρ  denotes a risk-aversion attitude),  
( )tF ic ψ  is a random variable with ψ  denoting an element from a probability 
space that is characterized by a lognormal distribution, and tF ic  is the mean of 
the distribution, 
E denotes expectation,  
taxp  is the probability that the tax will be established at all,   
0tp is the probability that, if established, the tax will be introduced before time 
0t ,  
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Cc  is the mean of uncertain carbon tax value,  
iλ  denotes the carbon emission of producing and consuming every unit good by 
technology i , and 
( )Cc ω  is a random variable with ω  denoting an element from a probability 
space that is characterized by a Weibull distribution. 
The objective function is composed of three parts. The first part is the cost with 
deterministic (or mean) learning rates; the second part is the expected cost resulted from 
overestimating larning rates; and the third part is the expected cost of paying carbon tax. 
The constraint function Eq. (9) denotes that total annual production of all three 
technologies must satisfy given demand; the constraint function Eq. (10) denotes that 
annual production for each technology does not exceed its total installed capacity; The 
constraint functions Eq. (11) and Eq. (12) denotes that decision variables can not be 
negative. 
We assume the scale of the problem is 100-year (e.g. from 1990 to 2090) with 10-year 
decision inteval. The model is solved for a sufficiently large sample N, where the size of 
N has been determined through successive experiments. Several successive model runs 
with the same sample size N are compared. If no major changes in the solution structure 
and the objective function can be observed then N is considered sufficient large (for 
more detail, see Messner et al. 1996).   
Table 1 summarizes all the initial values of parameters in the above optimization model. 
In the next subsection, we will introduce simulations with those initial values and 
sensitivity analysis of parameters.   
 
2.2 Simulations and Sensitivity Analysis 
2.2.1 Three-stage Simulations 
For showing how uncertainty in learning and the uncertain carbon tax affect 
technological change processes, we carried out simulations in three stages. In the first 
stage, simulations were carried out with deterministic learning, and without considering 
the carbon tax, i.e., the second and third part of the objective function (Eq. (8)) did not 
appear; in the second stage, uncertainty in learning was considered, but no carbon tax, 
i.e., the third part of Eq. (8) did not appear; and in the third stage, both uncertainty in 
learning and the uncertain carbon tax were considered. In each stage, we assume a basic 
case with those initial values in Table 1. The three basic cases for the three stages are 
called BC1, BC2 and BC3, respectively. Fig. 1 shows results of the three basic case 
simulations, from which we can see that the uncertainty in learning rate is a factor 
which will postpone the R&D investment on the “Revolutionary” technology, while the 
uncertain carbon tax will encourage earlier investment on the “Revolutionary” 
technology.   
 
 
 
 7
Table 1. Initial values of parameters. 
Parameters related to the three technologies  
 
Existing Tech. Incremental Tech. Revolutionary Tech. 
Initial cost (US$/kW(e)) 0
1 1000Fc =  
0
2 2000Fc =  
0
3 40000Fc =  
Efficiency 
1 30%η =  2 40%η =  3 90%η =  
Plant life (year) 
1 30τ =  2 30τ =  3 30τ =  
Initial Total Installed 
Capacity  (kW) 
0
1 100C =  
0
2 0C =  
0
3 0C =  
Initial Cumulative Installed 
Capacity (kW) 
0
1 1000C =  
0
2 1C =  
0
3 1C =  
O+M cost (US$/kW(e)) 
1 30OMc =  2 50OMc =  3 50OMc =  
Carbon emission 
coefficient 1
0.8λ =  2 0.8λ =  3 0.1λ =  
Mean Learning Rate of 
lognormal distributions1 1
0b =  
( 11 2 0b−− = ) 
2 0.1520b =  
( 21 2 10%b−− = ) 
3 0.5146b =  
( 31 2 30%b−− = ) 
Other Parameters 
Probability of carbon tax 0.33taxp =  Mean carbon tax of a Weibull 
distribution2 (US$/t) 
75cc =  
Demand in the base year 
(kW(e)) 
0 100D =  Annual Increasing rate of demand 2.6%α=  
Initial extraction cost (US$/kW(e)) 0 200Ec =  Extraction cost coefficient 0 0.01EK =  
Scale of the problem  100T = , decision interval is 10 years 
Discount rate 5%δ =  Risk factor 1ρ=  
 
1
 The lognormal PDF (probability distribution function) is 
( )2
2
ln
21( | , )
2
x
y f x e
x
μσμ σ σ − −= = π . For the learning 
rate of the  “Incremental” technology, we set ln 0.1μ = and 2 0.1σ = ; and for that of the “Revolutionary” one, we 
set ln 0.3μ =  and 2 0.1σ = . 
2
 The mathematic formulation of the Weibull distribution 1( , )   ( 0),
b
x
b b ay f x a b ba x e x
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜− ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜− − ⎝ ⎠= = ≥  where 
a  is called the scale parameter and b  is called the shape parameter. For the uncertain carbon tax, we set 
75a= and 1b= . 
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2.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
For studying in detail the behavior of the model, we did sensitivity analysis at both the 
second and the third stage. The sensitivity analysis at the second stage is for exploring 
model behaviors with different values of those parameters related to initial cost, 
uncertain learning, demand, discounted rate and extraction; and that at the third stage is 
for studying how different carbon tax policy influences the technological change 
process. In the following we first introduce the sensitivity analysis without considering 
carbon tax, then we briefly introduce the sensitivity analysis on the uncertain carbon 
tax.    
R--Revolutionary, I – Incremental, E-Existing 
Figure 1. Results of basic case simulations at three stages. 
Fig. 2 shows the break-even time of the “Revolutionary” technology (i.e. when its share 
begins to be over 50%) with different combination of learning rate and initial cost. We 
can see that the break-even time of the “Revolutionary” technology was postponed with 
the increase of its initial cost and with the decrease of its learning rate. Due to the 
stochastic feature included in the model, Fig. 2 is non-smooth and non-convex. 
Generally, the break-even time is more sensitive to the learning rate than initial cost. 
But when its learning rate is small (< 20%), a small change in initial cost also resulted 
in great change for the break-even time of the “Revolutionary” technology.    
Ek  in Eq. (4) denotes how extraction cost is sensitive to the total extraction. It indirectly 
indicates how abundant the resource is. If the resource is very abundant, then the 
extraction cost will not be affected very much by the total extraction, i.e., the Ek  is very 
small, with the extreme as 0.  Our sensitivity  analysis on  Ek   accords with our intuition 
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Figure 2. Break-even time of the “Revolutionary” technology with different learning rate and 
initial cost. 
 
that the rarer the resource is, the earlier the “revolutionary” technology will be widely 
applied. With the increase of Ek from 0.005 to 0.1, the break-even time of the 
“Revolutionary” technology was brought forward by 2 decades.    
We assumed different demand scenarios by varying α  in Eq. (1) from 1 to 2. We found 
high demand could bring forward the break-even time for three decades. We also 
assumed different demand functions. As shown in the left side of Fig. 3, we assumed 
“log”, “linear” and “exponential” demand functions. With the log demand function, the 
demand increases very fast at the early stage, and then becomes slower and slower, and 
we call it a “decelerated increase demand path”; with the linear one, the demand 
increases with a constant rate, and we say it is a “constant increase demand path”; and 
with an exponential one, demand increase faster and faster, and we call it an 
“accelerated increase demand path”. As shown in the right side of Fig. 3, with the same 
destination, different “demand increasing path” will impact the development of 
advanced technology. An early fast increase in demand (in log formulation) will favor 
the early break-even of the “Revolutionary” technology.       
 10
 
1—Exponential demand function; 2—Linear demand function; 3—Log demand function 
Figure 3.  Different demand functions and their corresponding diffusion paths of the 
“Revolutionary” technology. 
 
We varied discount rate from 0 to 10%. Ceteris paribus, higher discount rates result in 
postponed break-even time of the “Revolutionary” technology. This result was to be 
expected considering the decisive influence of the discount rate on the objective 
function. Higher discount rate means much more weight is put on current capital, thus 
invest early is not an economic strategy.   
We varied ρ  in Eq. (8) to see how different risk attitude affect the decision on R&D 
investment, we found there was a tendency that the break-even time of the 
“Revolutionary” technology postponed with the increasing emphasis on risk aversion. 
We also varied the dispersion of the lognormal distribution of the “Revolutionary” 
technology’s and found that large dispersion, i.e., large uncertainty, can postpone the 
break-even time of the “Revolutionary” technology.  
By simulations with different assumptions on mean value and dispersions, we studied 
how the uncertain carbon tax affects technological change process. We found that high 
mean value of the carbon tax and high uncertainty will favorite early R&D investment 
on the “revolutionary” technology.  
3 Modeling with Two Heterogeneous Agents 
This section extends the model introduced in Section 2 by assuming that there are two 
heterogeneous decision agents, agent 1 and agent 2, operating simultaneously in the 
technological change process. Focusing on agents’ different risk attitudes to the 
potential learning of the “Incremental” and “Revolutionary” technology, now we 
assume a deterministic carbon tax for the two agents – the carbon tax will be applied 
from 2060 with 50$/t for carbon emission. The agents’ heterogeneities considered here 
are agents’ different risk attitudes and weights. We use 1ρ  and 2ρ  to denote the risk 
factors for agent 1 and agent 2, respectively. We assume agent 1 is a risk-taking one and 
1 0.1ρ = , and agent 2 is a risk-aversion one and 2 1ρ = . With smaller risk factor, agent 
1 is a pioneer to develop and adopt new technology, while agent 2 is a follower.  
Agents’ weights denote their sizes or their share in the total system. The weight for the 
agent 1 is 1 (0,1)w ∈ , and the weight for agent 2 is 2 (0,1)w ∈ . The two weights satisfy 
the formulation: 1 2 1w w+ = .  
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The interaction between the two agents includes trade on resource and good and 
technology spillover. Trade on resource and good means that one agent can buy 
resource and good from the other. In terms of minimize the aggregated costs of the two 
agents, the model does not treat the price of resource and good, instead it includes the 
cost of the trade. This cost can be viewed as cost for transportation, distributions and 
any other additional cost caused by moving and using resource and good from the other 
agent. We assume 1θ and 2θ  are the unit costs for trade of resource and good, 
respectively. The quantity of trade flow at each time step is treated as decision variables.  
We distinguish two kinds of technology spillover effects: technological “free-riding” 
and technology trade. Technological free-riding means that one agent can benefit from 
the other’s learning effect without cost, but most of time with some delay. There are no 
additional decision variables for free-riding. Technology trade means that one agent can 
benefit from the other’s experience (quantified by cumulative installed capacity) with 
some cost, and we assume 3θ  as the unit cost of buying experience. Technology trade is 
different from resource trade and good trade in sense that the bargainer agent does not 
lose the experience, unlike in the case of resource and good trade. It just shares the 
experience with the purchaser agent. Again, here we do not consider the price of 
technology. And we let the quantity of technology trade at each time step be decision 
variables.  
The objective function of the optimization can be simply denoted as  
( )
( )
1 2
1 2
1
3
1
min
(1 )
(1 )
T
t t t
t
T
t t
t
A A
r g
s
δ θ θ
δ θ
=
=
+
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,                                    (13)  
where  
1A  and 2A  denotes agent 1’s and agent 2’s costs, respectively, introduced in Eq. 
(8), but with a deterministic carbon tax, 
 T denotes the scale of the problem,  
δ  denotes the discount rate, 
1θ , 2θ  and 3θ denote the unit costs of trade on resource, good and technology, 
respectively,  
t
r , 
tg  and ts  denotes trade quantity of resource, good and technology at time t , 
respectively.   
In Eq. (13), the first part includes all cost mentioned in Section 2, but with a 
deterministic carbon tax, for both agent 1 and agent 2; the second part is the cost of 
trade on resource and good; and the third part is the cost of technology trade. The two 
agents’ weights do not appear in the objective function, instead they appear in 
constrains related to demand. Suppose tD  is the demand in whole market at time step t, 
then agent 1’s demand at time step t is 1 1
t tD w D= , and agent 2’s demand at time step t 
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is 2 2 1(1 )t t tD w D w D= = − . The tr , tg  and ts  can be negative, depending on the 
direction of the trade, and we assume the flow from agent 1 to agent 2 is positive.   
Obviously, we can generate infinite future scenarios and stories with different 
combinations of those parameters. And also with some specification value, the model 
can be used for some practical analysis. But before that, we would show the behaviors 
of the model, and which is the main purpose of this paper.  
3.1 Optimization Without Technology Spillover  
Firstly we run a simulation called BC4 with 1 0.5w = , 2 0.5w = , 1 0.1ρ = , 2 1ρ = , 
1 2 140θ θ= =  and without technology spillover effect. Fig. 4 shows the result of BC4, 
we can see that agent 2 develops no “Revolutionary” technology, and it imports good 
from agent 1 from 2050. We varied the trade costs of resource and good to see how it 
would influence the two agents’ decision, and we found: 
 
R--Revolutionary, I – Incremental, E-Existing 
Figure 4.  Simulation result of BC4. 
 • When the trade cost is small ( 1 2 80θ θ= < ), agent 2 develops neither the 
“Incremental” technology, nor the “Revolutionary” one. It exports its resource to 
agent 1 and imports good from agent 1.  • With the increasing of the trade costs, there is a general tendency that the trade 
appears later and later and the quantity of trade becomes smaller and smaller, 
which means both agents operate more and more locally, and this results in 
delay of the development of the “Revolutionary” technology. For example, 
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when the trade costs of resource and good increase from 40 to 200, the break-
even of the “Revolutionary” technology in agent 1’s market is delayed for one 
decade, and it is delayed for 2 decades in the whole market. When the trade 
costs are high enough, for example 1 2 300θ θ= = , there is neither trade on 
resource nor that on good. Both agent 1 and agent 2 operate on their local market 
and based on their local resource. And both agents develop the “Incremental” 
technology without developing the “Revolutionary” one during the 100 years.   
From the above simulations, we can learn that the interaction between agents really 
influences the technological change process, both in global and in local level. 
Globalization maybe acts as a driving force for the development of advanced 
technologies because development of advanced technologies commonly needs huge 
investment which probably requires a very large potential market to reimburse it.     
3.2 Optimization with Technological  “Free-Riding” 
Now we consider the situation that there is free-riding between agents. That is to say, 
although agent 2 does not have R&D investment on the “Revolutionary” technology, it 
can benefit from agent 1’s learning effect. We assume that agent 2’s future investment 
cost on the “Revolutionary” technology relies on agent 1’s cumulative installed 
capacity, but with one-decade delay. 
With the parameter values set in BC4, we found the “free-riding” made agent 2 develop 
the “Revolutionary” technology from 2080, and the diffusion time of it was very short. 
As shown in Fig. 5, agent 2 starts to import good from agent 1 from 2050, then after 
making a successful “free-riding” from 2080, it begins to produce good for itself and 
decreases the import from agent 1. We found with low trade costs, i.e., 1 2 40θ θ= = , the 
“free-riding” did not show its effect at all, because with low trade cost, it is more 
economic for the whole system if agent 2 exports resource to agent 1 and imports good 
from agent 1. In the rest of this paper, we call the simulation with the parameter values 
set in BC4 and plus “free-riding” the BC5. 
Based on BC5, we varied the two agents’ weights to see how different weight 
influences agents’ decision behaviors. We found when agent 1’s weight is small, i.e., 
1 0.2w < , agent 1 will jump to the “Revolutionary” technology, without developing the 
“Incremental” one. This is because small weight (thus a small local market) will make it 
reluctant to develop new technologies, but the global market will encourage it to 
develop new technologies, and agent 2’s “free-riding” on the “Revolutionary” 
technology will encourage agent 1 to develop the “Revolutionary” technology since it 
can reduce the total system’s cost.  Fig. 6 shows the trade on good with different size 
of the two agents, from which we can see that with the decrease of agent 1’s weight (or 
the increase of agent 2’s weight) agent 2 imports more good from agent 1 during the 
period from 2040 to 2090. With a small 1w , agent 2 exports some good to agent 1 
during the period from 2020 to 2040 because during that period agent 1 is doing R&D 
on the “Revolutionary” technology, while agent 2 builds a bigger capacity of the 
“Incremental” technology.  With a big 1w , i.e., 1 0.5w > , from 2080 to 2090, the import 
from agent 1 to agent 2 decreases, this is because agent 2’s local market is small and its 
production can satisfy its own market after making “free-riding”.  
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R--Revolutionary, I – Incremental, E-Existing 
 
Figure 5.  Result of BC4+free-riding (or BC5). 
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3.3 Optimization with Technology Trade Instead of “Free-Riding” 
In the above, “free-riding” means one agent can benefit from the other’s learning effect 
without any cost, but with some delay (eg. one decade). In terms of technology trade, 
we allow an agent to decide whether it need buy technology, or more precisely the 
experience in a new technology, from the other and when to buy. Technology trade is 
different from resource trade and good trade in the sense that the bargainer agent does 
not lose the experience, unlike in the case of resource and good trade. It just shares the 
experience with the purchaser agent. In our simulations, the bought experience does not 
be calculated when calculating the cumulative installed capacity of the next term. In the 
following simulation, which we call BC6, we assume that based on BC4, agent 2 will 
buy the “Revolutionary” technology from agent 1 with the trade cost 3 10θ =  for each 
unit experience (or cumulative installed capacity). Fig. 7 shows the result of BC6, from 
which we can see that agent 2 buys the “Revolutionary” technology in 2060, and the 
diffusion of the “Revolutionary” technology in agent 2 is shorter than that in agent 1. 
We varied the technology trade cost and found that with a small one, e.g., 3 6θ < , the 
quantity of trading is higher, but the trading time remains the same – in 2060 – which 
makes the break-even time of the “Revolutionary” technology in agent 2 slightly earlier; 
and with a high technology trade cost, e.g., 3 12θ > , it becomes uneconomic for agent 2 
to import technology from agent 1, and agent 2 keeps using the “Incremental” 
technology, without developing the “Revolutionary” one during the 100 years.  
 
 
Figure 6.  Trade on good with different weights of agents. 
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R--Revolutionary, I – Incremental, E-Existing 
Figure 7.  Result of BC6. 
 
In our simulations, with different risk attitude on the future cost of advanced technology 
and with technology spillover effect between them, agent 1 and agent 2 act as a pioneer 
and a follower, respectively, and the diffusion time of the “Revolutionary” is shorter for 
the follower than that for the pioneer, which accords with historical observation that the 
later developer of a new technology can obtain a shorter diffusion period (see Grubler, 
A., Nakicenovic, N., and D.G. Victor 1999). 
3.4 Pareto Optimality of the Solutions 
Simply speaking, Pareto Optimality is the “best that could be achieved without 
disadvantaging at least one group” (see A. Schick 1970). Here we mathematically prove 
that the global optimal solutions of the two-agent model are of Pareto optimality, in the 
sense that none of the two agents could be made better off without the other being made 
worse off.  The mathematic symbols used here are independent form those used above. 
 
Suppose the two agents’ objective functions are 1( )f x  and 2 ( )f x , and *x ∈Ω (Ω  is the 
feasible set) is a global optimal solution for the problem: 
 1 2min ( ) ( ) ( )f x f x f x= + . (14) 
*x ∈Ω  is proved to be of Pareto optimality by using the following reduction to 
absurdity. 
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Figure 8.  Different carbon emission paths. 
 
Suppose there exist a x ∈Ω  such that ( ) ( *)i if x f x≤  for all {1, 2}i ∈ , with at least one 
strict inequality, then ( ) ( *)f x f x<  is true, i.e., *x  is not a global solution, which is not 
true. So there is no x ∈Ω  such that ( ) ( *)i if x f x≤  for all {1, 2}i ∈ , with at least one 
strict inequality, which means the global optimal solution is Pareto efficient. It is also 
easy to prove that if there are more than two agents, global optimal solutions are also of 
Pareto optimality. 
4 Carbon Emission Paths as Results of Different Technological 
Change Process  
There are two important factors contributing to emission paths: the demand (or 
consumption) and the technologies used to satisfy the demand. Fig. 8 shows different 
emission paths of different simulations. BC3 shows the strongest carbon abatement in 
all the six simulations, while BC2 is the weakest one. The following are the main 
discoveries related to carbon emission paths in our simulations.  
 • Our model demonstrates an endogenous learning mechanism for the advanced 
technology to replace the existing one. The simulations show that even without 
carbon tax, the carbon emission could be reduced by the wide application of 
advanced technology. • The uncertainty in learning rate will delay the development of the 
“Revolutionary” technology, thus results in delayed and weaker carbon 
abatement.  • Carbon tax, especially the uncertainty in carbon tax, is a driving force for the 
earlier development of the “Revolutionary” technology. That’s the reason why 
BC3 shows the strongest carbon abatement. BC4, BC5 and BC6 include a 
deterministic carbon tax, not a uncertain one, so the carbon abatement is weaker 
than that in BC3.  
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• Although technological learning can lead to the reduction of carbon emission, a 
carbon tax is still important in the following two senses:  
i. It can control the maximal annual emission. As show in Fig. 8, 
without carbon tax, the maximal annual emission is relatively high 
in BC2. While with the uncertain carbon tax, the maximal annual 
emission is low in BC3.  
ii. It can bring forward the low-emission time. In Fig. 8, with the 
uncertain carbon tax, in BC3, the carbon emission starts to decrease 
from 2030; while without carbon tax, i.e., in BC2, the carbon 
emission starts to decrease from 2060. In some special situations, 
carbon tax will become extremely important. For example, in some 
urban cities with high density of population and rapid increase in 
energy consumption demand, without carbon tax, it is possible that 
the emission reduction caused only by technology improvement 
will be too late for maintaining the ecosystem in those urban cities. • People maybe have the intuition that technological spillover should be helpful 
for carbon abatement. But this is not always true. Sometimes the existing of 
technological spillover would weaken carbon abatement in a certain period. As 
shown in Fig. 8, with technology trade, the carbon emission of BC6 is higher 
than that of BC4 during the period from 2040 to 2065. This is because with 
technological spillover effect, agent 2 imports less good from agent 1 during that 
period which results in two consequences; the first one is that agent 1 develops 
the “Revolutionary” technology slightly late since its market is smaller, and the 
second one is, the two agents, especially agent 2, consume more good produced 
by the “Incremental” technology rather than by the “Revolutionary” one during 
that period which results in weaker carbon abatement. Another story which we 
learnt from the simulations about why technological spillover could weaken 
carbon abatement during a certain period is that when the trade on good is little 
because of high trade cost, in a short or middle-term, it is possible that agent 2, 
knowing the technological spillover effort, will rely more on the “Existing” 
technology and develop less “Incremental” one, waiting for the “Revolutionary” 
technology to be developed by the pioneer agent.  • The emission path is not necessary convex. For example, for BC4, by 2050, the 
global energy system has completely shifted to the “Revolutionary” technology, 
and the carbon emission reaches its bottom in 2050, then it increases again 
because of the increasing consumption. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
Based on earlier and pioneering work done at IIASA, this paper presented a model of 
endogenous technological change with increasing return, uncertainty and heterogeneous 
agents. Although the model and simulations are highly stylized, they can enhance 
people’s imagination about how the three stylized facts impact technological change 
processes. Here we summarize what we learnt from the modeling and simulations 
introduced in this paper. 
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• The model and simulations demonstrates an endogenous learning mechanism for 
the advanced technology to replace the existing one. The S-shape diffusion 
pattern of new technologies in our simulations accords with historical 
observations. • Facing uncertainty in technological learning, decision makers would prefer late 
R&D on advanced technologies. Of course, decision makers’ different risk-
attitudes will play an important role in their decisions. A risk-taking decision 
maker would prefer earlier R&D on advanced technologies than a risk-aversion 
one.  • The factors which can contribute to the early R&D investment on an advanced 
technology and its wide application include  
{ high learning rate of the new advanced technology,  
{ lower initial cost of the advanced technology,  
{ high resource extraction cost, or that the resource is becoming rare, 
{ low discount rate,   
{ low uncertainty in learning rate,  
{ low-sensitivity to risk, or the decision agent is adventuring,  
{ high carbon tax,  
{ and high uncertainty in carbon tax.    • Globalization maybe acts as a driving force for the development of advanced 
technologies because development of advanced technologies commonly needs 
huge investment which probably requires a very large potential market to 
reimburse it. • Technological spillover could also slow or delay the wide application of 
advanced technologies and thus weaken carbon abatement in a certain period, 
mainly in a short or middle term period.    
In terms of minimizing their aggregated costs, the two heterogeneous agents are 
assumed to be cooperative. In real world, it is possible that some decision makers do not 
accept the optimization result, because they want to maximize their profit. For example, 
a technology pioneer develops an advanced technology earlier than others, it is possible 
that it would apply a very high pricing strategy for its products and technology, and this 
will delay the wide adoption of the new technology than what Pareto optimization 
suggests. Other factors prevent decision makers from following Pareto optimization 
include security issues. For example, in some situations, Pareto optimization suggests 
an agent with small local market to import good such as gasoline from others, instead of 
building its own capacities, but the agent thinks the good is very important for it and so 
it refuses to completely depend on import since it does not want its fate to be controlled 
by others.  
Matlab Optimization Toolbox was used to solve the optimization problems, and global 
optimality of solutions was checked by employing different starting points. In the future 
work, global optimization software or solvers, such as TomLab (see 
http://www.tomlab.biz) and BARON (see Sahinidis 2000), will be applied for global 
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optimization, and it is also important to develop a specific global search algorithm that 
essentially utilizes the features of the general model. And the stability of Pareto optimal 
solutions should be explored when the model is used for real applications. 
We started from understanding of the three important stylized facts that were 
summarized from historical observations, then included them into equation-based 
models, and generated some patterns according with other historical observations, 
which makes the equation-based model more reliable. On the other hand, the equation-
based model can help us to get better understanding of history and future. History 
(story)-based study and equation-based models can be and should be complementary to 
each other in the research of social issues.   
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